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INTRODUCTION: THE GREENMAIL

DILEMMA

Greenmail,' described by one commentator as "legal corporate blackmail by
raiders,''2 is difficult to define and even more difficult to regulate. The unique
aspects of greenmail distinguish it from other takeover situations, 3 and render
existing regulatory and common law restraints obsolete.4 The recent greenmail
incident involving Walt Disney Productions (hereinafter "WDP") and Saul
Steinberg illustrates both the corporate abuse wrought by greenmail, and the
ineffectiveness of present laws to curtail this abuse.
The WDP Board of Directors fought off investor Saul Steinberg's hostile

1. Greenmail occurs when acquirers of a large block of stock threaten a takeover unless the
corporation's directors repurchase the shares at a premium. 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
21, at 913 (May 25, 1984).
2. Commission Seeks Legislation to Limit Golden Parachutes, Tender Offer Abuses, 16 Smc. REo. &
L. REP. (BNA) No. 13, at 573 (March 30, 1984) (quoting Martin Lipton).
3. The threatened takeover assault may be so costly and time-consuming to challenge that
management often realistically has no choice but to buy the greenmailer out. Green & Junewicz,
A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 706 (1984).
4. Existing federal law primarily regulates transactions leading to a shift in control. See Bath
Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970) (regarding legislative history and purpose underlying
§ 13(d) of the Williams Act). Legislative history shows Congress intended to protect the investor
faced with a potential shift in corporate control. Id. at 109. Greenmail is largely unaddressed by
these concerns. Stephen Friedman, of Goldman, Sachs & Co. in New York, noted that greenmail
is "objectionable to anyone who minds being called a crook in the newspapers ...[and is] certain
to get worse." Dominate 15th PLI Securities Institute, 15 Sac. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 45, at
2104, 2108 (November 18, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Acquisitions].
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6
tender offer 5 initially by invoking traditional defensive tactics, but ultimately
by purchasing Steinberg's holdings at a substantial premium over market price.
Essentially, Steinberg received a "greenmail ransom" of some $31 million from
the WDP Board. 7 Steinberg extracted a handsome profit while the WDP Board
retained management control. The Disney scenario offers a working model of
the problem resulting when management submits to the greenmailer with corporate funds but without shareholder knowledge or consent.
Between March 9 and March 19, 1984, the Steinberg-controlled Reliance
Financial Services Corporation and its subsidiaries (hereinafter the "Steinberg
8
Group" or "Group") acquired 6.3 percent of WDP's outstanding shares. In
early April, the Steinberg Group increased its holdings to 9.3 percent and soon
afterward announced its intention to purchase up to 25 percent of Disney's
shares for "investment." 9 When the Steinberg Group's holdings reached the
12.1 percent level,'" WDP's management began to act to prevent Steinberg
from acquiring a controlling interest in the corporation.
WDP management first acquired Arvida Corporation, a real estate concern,
in exchange for 3.3 million WDP shares." As a result, Disney assumed $190
million in Arvida debt.' 2 Disney then began negotiating to acquire Gibson

5. The terms "tender offer," "takeover bid," and "takeover offer" are sometimes used
interchangeably. Note, Corporate Battles for Control - Edgar v. MITE and the Constitutionality of State
Takeover Legislation - The Continuing Saga, 26 How. L.J. 1425, 1426 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Corporate Battles]. This type of transaction is one of four major methods of achieving a change
in corporate control. A tender offer occurs when an outside entity (the "offeror") decides to acquire
a corporation (the "target"), and conducts the acquisition by offering shareholders a premium price
for their holdings in the target's shares. The three remaining techniques for obtaining control are
mergers, the sale of corporate assets, and proxy fights. Management plays a substantial role in
mergers and the sale of assets, while proxy fights are generally difficult to wage and are prohibitively
expensive. The tender offer, therefore, remains the most effective means of shifting corporate control
away from incumbent management. Note, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act: Can There Be Manipulation
with Full Disclosure or Was The Mobil Court Running on Empty?, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 160-161
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Manipulation With Full Disclosure].
6. Defensive tactics fall into two general categories: communicative and obstructive. See, e.g,
Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901,
939 (1979). Communicative tactics include management's response to the tender offer, advice to
shareholders regarding the adequacy of the offering price, recommendations to shareholders with
respect to the offer, and communicating information about the offeror. Greene & Junewicz, supra
note 3, at 682. Obstructive tactics, however, have a direct effect on the offer's success. Management
may institute litigation against the offeror, search for a "white knight" or more attractive bidder,
or enter into options which "lock up" the sale of stock or assets in friendly hands, making the
takeover more difficult and/or less valuable. Lock-ups typically involve the sale of the "crown
jewel"-the most valuable corporate asset - in order to defeat the offeror's intent to acquire a
lucrative business. See generally Harrington, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The Legal Propriety of Defenses
Against Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 SYRAcusE L. REV. 977, 985-86 (1983).
7. Acquisitions, supra, note 4; Wall St. J., June 12, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
8. Plaintiff's Complaint, at 6-7, Heckmann v. Walt Disney Prod., No. CA000851 (Cal.
App. Dep't. Super. Ct. filed June 20, 1984).
9. Id. at 7-9.
10. Id. at 7.
11.
Id.
12. Id. at 6. Buying out a debt-ridden company is one form of the "scorched earth defense."
This defense is designed to render the target so unattractive that no offeror would want to acquire
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Greetings, Inc., a greeting card manufacturer, for a minimum of $310 million
in WDP stock. These moves diluted the value of all WDP shareholders' holdings; the Steinberg Group's ownership interest was correspondingly reduced to
3
11.1 percent.
The Steinberg Group retaliated on two fronts. First, the Group sued to
enjoin the Gibson transaction as a "fraud upon shareholders." Second, on June
8 the Group submitted a tender offer of $67.50 per share for WDP stock with
an actual book value of $54.25. The Steinberg Group also stated that it was
prepared to raise this price to $72.50 per share if Disney would discontinue
4
the Gibson acquisition and agree to withhold from other such agreements.'
5
Steinberg announced his intention was to obtain control of WDP,' and to
6
dismantle the corporation if his efforts were successful.'
Disney's directors met secretly to discuss the Steinberg situation and agreed
to repurchase WDP stock from the Steinberg Group at $70.83 per share. Additionally, WDP paid Steinberg $28 million as reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses. Steinberg agreed in return to dismiss the Gibson lawsuit and to refrain
7
from purchasing WDP stock over the next 10 years.1
Steinberg's total profit from the four-month venture amounted to more than
$31 million. 8 While WDP stock sold for about $50.00 per share prior to the
Group's acquisition plan, and rose as high as $65.50 per share during the
takeover threat, the price dropped to less than $50.00 per share immediately
after announcement of the Disney-Steinberg agreement. 9 In addition to the loss
of market value, WDP's shareholders' existing holdings were diluted by the
Arvida acquisition, and Arvida's precarious debt situation left Disney less fi20
nancially attractive to other investors.
Disney's directors, faced with the greenmail dilemma, considered that the
costliness of a takeover battle justified the sacrifice of short-term goals for longrun stability. 2' If WDP had known that Steinberg's sole motive was to sell his

interest at a profit after threatening ,a takeover, however, management could
have called his bluff. Though Steinberg threatened to dismantle the corporation,
which seems to support WDP's response, WDP knew or should have known
it. Tactical Maneuvers: From Bear Hugs to Greenmail, PERSONAL

INVESTOR,

July 1985, at 15 [hereinafter

cited as Tactical Maneuvers].
13. Complaint, supra note 8,' at 7.
14. Id. at 8.
15.

Wall St. J., June 11, 1984, at 2, col. 3. Such threats to dismantle the corporation if

the takeover is successful are commonplace. If the acquirer has earned a reputation of ousting
current management after a successful bid, target managers are more willing to be greenmailed.

Most recently, Warner Communications paid hostile bidder Rupert Murdoch a 35 percent premium
over market value for his Warner Stock. Tactical Maneuvers, supra note 12, at 14. See also infra text

accompanying notes 181-183.
16. Complaint, supra, note 8, at 8.
17. Id. at 9.
18. Wall St. J., June 12, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
19.

Complaint, supra, note 8, at 9-10.

20.

Id. at 11-12; see also Wall St. J., June 13, 1984, at 59, col. 4.

21.

See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3 (management's justification in responding defensively

to a tender offer).
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that Steinberg used greenmail successfully in the past. 22 WDP directors were
therefore not entirely without notice as to his true intentions. The problem
faced by WDP's management is the same problem faced in all adversarial
situations: how to be sure of the opposition's intent.
Determining subjective intent is a recurrent problem in the takeover context,
and is especially troublesome with greenmail. While federal law requires full
disclosure by persons contemplating a takeover, 3 disclosure alone will not give
management adequate notice of the greenmailer's true intentions.2 4 Thus, the
issue in regulating greenmail is how to preserve both corporate stability and
shareholder autonomy, and how to protect the shareholders' investment, in the
face of a hostile takeover bid which may or may not result in greenmail.
Tender offers are private transactions between the offeror and the target
corporation's shareholders. 25 Although directors are not parties to the offer,
management usually responds in some way when an offer 26 like Steinberg's is
made.22 The shareholders must then decide whether to tender (sell) their shares
to the offeror, retain their holdings regardless of the outcome, or join management in resisting the offer. The price offered, shareholder satisfaction with
existing management, informed knowledge about the offeror, and recommendations made by the target should all be considered in the decision. When
target directors submit to greenmail, however, they preclude shareholders from
responding to the hostile offer, 28 which is usually well above market price.29
In the ordinary tender offer situation, the underlying motive is control of
the corporation. Incumbent management thus has a vested interest in maintaining its position (known as "self-entrenchment"). However, management has
the countervailing duty to act in the corporation's best interests.2 0 If an offeror

22.

Wall St. J., supra note 15.

23. Infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
25. Manipulation With Full Disclosure, supra note 5, at 160.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6 (management's response to hostile tender offer).
27. The tender offer as a means of obtaining corporate control is unique, however, in that
it is not subject to effective control by management. See Manipulation With Full Disclosure, supra note
5, at 161.
28. Advocates of the doctrine of "shareholder autonomy" argue that stockholders should
always have the freedom to respond to an advantageous tender offer and that management should
have no input in the transaction, since the offer maximizes shareholder wealth and acts to check
inefficient management. See Harrington, supra note 6, at 983.
29. See id. at 982-83. The theory of the "efficient capital market" holds that efficient markets
reflect all information regarding corporate management in the current price for the company's stock.
If the company is poorly managed, the stock price will be correspondingly low. The only tender
offerors willing to purchase the stock at a premium, therefore, would be those who feel they could
manage the corporation more efficiently. If this perception is correct, everyone benefits from the
resulting change in control. The shareholders who tender their shares receive a profit, shareholders
retaining their holdings are rewarded by more efficient management, and society as a whole benefits
from the allocation of scarce resources into more productive channels. Id.
30. Id. at 989-90. In takeovers, a conflict of interest is "unavoidably thrust upon" the corporation's directors. Id. (quoting Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 60 (1966)). The
tension exists between maximizing shareholder wealth and perpetuating management's control over
the corporation as well as the "jobs, salaries, prerequisites, power, and prestige of the individual
managers". Id.
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seeks to "loot" the corporation after acquisition, management may, in addition
31
to recommending that shareholders not respond, act to further block the offer.
Some advocates, in fact, argue that management should have unlimited discretion over the corporation's response to a takeover bid. 32 This allocation of
responsibility, some argue, allows management to consider long-term goals as
well as short-term wealth maximization for shareholders.3 3 However, where the
offeror is a greenmailer and is not seeking control of the corporation, management has no reason to block the offer.3 4 Instead of reacting to entrench itself
in office, management can simply refuse to pay the greenmailer and leave the
35
final decision to the shareholders.
Federal lawmakers recognize that takeover attempts can be either detrimental
or beneficial to the corporate welfare, 3 6 and have attempted to balance the
interests of both target and offeror. The federal policy of neutrality, 37 however,
3
does little to protect investors deprived of a tender offer because of greenmail. 8
39
Federal antifraud provisions prohibit "manipulation" of the securities market,
40
but that regulation has not been read to include self-entrenchment tactics.
Moreover, while state law imposes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty upon
corporate directors, courts are reluctant to impose strict standards. 41 Instead,
the so-called "business judgment rule ' 42 effectively bars most state claims by

31. See supra note 6 (obstructive tactics which block the offer).
32. Under this view, the decision to oppose a tender offer is indistinguishable from other
corporate decisions. Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 621, 655 (1983).

33. See Ha'rrington, supra note 6 at 979 ("[w]ith few exceptions, the judicial decisions squarely
support this...view....").
34. See Chock Full O'Nuts Corp. v. Finkelstein, 548 F. Supp. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("management need merely refuse to pay more than fair market value for stock offered by the
alleged coercive Insurgents.....
35. Id.
36. Congress initially proposed pro-management regulations intended to aid the target's efforts
to defeat a takeover. However, Congress ultimately chose a policy of neutrality, recognizing that
takeover bids could serve the "useful purpose" of checking "entrenched but inefficient management". Note, supra note 32, at 633. See also supra note 29 (theory of the efficient capital market).
Some takeovers are beneficial in disciplining management, while others may lead management to
emphasize short-term rather than long-term profits, perhaps to the detriment of the corporation.
Excerpts From Final Report of SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 28, at 1375, 1378 (July 15, 1983).
37. Note, supra note 32, at 633.
38. Id. at 629-30. Greenmail circumvents federal disclosure requirements which were enacted
to facilitate informed shareholder decisions, because it prevents a tender offer from even reaching
shareholders. Consequently, shareholders have no decision.
39. See infra notes 163, 184-88 and accompanying text (federal antifraud provisions).
40. See infra notes 176-77, 210-12 and accompanying text (manipulation read narrowly).
41. Professor Gordon notes that Florida courts have never held directors liable for negligence.
M. GORDON, FLORIDA CORPORATIONS MANUAL § 21.03 (1976).
42. The business judgment rule states that courts will not interfere with managerial judgment
without a showing of fraud or self-dealing. Under this doctrine, directors enjoy a presumption of
good faith and corporate decisions will not be reviewed if they can be justified by any rational
business purpose. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3, at 712. Accordingly, Professor Cohn notes
that "judicial retreat into the presumptive arena of the business judgment rule" leaves doubt as
to whether there remains a "viable shareholder action in areas other than fraud, conflict of interest,
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forcing shareholders to overcome a presumption of management's good faith. 3
Present law, therefore, provides an inadequate solution to the greenmail dilemma.
The SEC and Congress, in response to the recent emergence of greenmail,
are attempting to remedy the problems.4 4 The SEC Advisory Committee on
Tender Offer Reform recently issued fifty recommendations including a ban on
greenmail. 4 5 Proposed Congressional legislation would also ban greenmail under
certain conditions,4 and would fundamentally change existing tender offer regulation.4 7 This Note will examine the present state of securities law and evaluate
the probable effect of proposed legislation with respect to greenmail. The author
contends that federal legislation is needed to remedy this national problem,
although revision of state corporate codes would provide additional protection
to shareholders. Existing proposals for change, however, may prove unworkable
4 8
as both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in certain basic respects.
II.
A.

EXISTING

STATE

COMMON

LAW AND

STATUTORY

REMEDIES

State Regulation of Director's Duties: The Business Judgment Rule

In response to the Disney-Steinberg agreement, WDP shareholders instituted
numerous derivative suits alleging state claims for breach of fiduciary duty.
Under state law generally, directors and other corporate insiders owe a fiduciary
duty to shareholders. 4 9 This obligation is traditionally couched in terms of duties
of care and loyalty.5 In the takeover context, fiduciary obligations apply to
defensive tactics not solely communicative in nature -" and require directors to
refrain from opposing an offer unless they objectively determine the offer is
detrimental to shareholder interests. 52 Self-entrenchment schemes as well as sub-

disloyalty, or the disclosure concerns of the federal securities laws." Cohn, Demise of The Director's
Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx.
L. REV. 591, 594 (1983).
43. In order to rebut this presumption, shareholders must show more than a self-entrenchment
motive. M. GORDON, supra note 41, 5 21.01.
44. See infra notes 232-60 and accompanying text (proposals for change).
45. See infa notes 232-37 and accompanying text (SEC Advisory Committee Recommendations).
46. See infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text (legislative proposals to ban greenmail).
47. See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text (legislative proposals altering tender offer
regulation).
48. See infra notes 263-72 and accompanying text (critique of proposals and author's recommendations).
49. Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 905. In addition to disclosure requirements, management has a fiduciary duty to shareholders which should apply to obstructive defensive tactics.
Id. See note 75 infra for a discussion of derivative suits.
50. Harrington, supra note 6, at 987.
51.
See supra note 6 (communicative and obstructive defensive tactics); note 49 and accompanying text (fiduciary obligations).
52. Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 914-15 (managerial resistance in order to preserve
jobs and status constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty). See e.g., Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v.
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mission- to greenmail"5 constitute breaches of fiduciary duty if the stockholders
would have profited from the proposed tender offer.M The presumption of managerial good faith under the business judgment rule, however, prevents strict
enforcement of these fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.55
The Model Business Corporation Act defines management's duty of care as
the obligation to manage "with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in
a like position would use under similar circumstances. "56 Although this delinition suggests a negligence standard, courts rarely hold directors liable for
"mere" negligence. 57 Instead, the business judgment rule shields directors from
liability in the absence of fraud or traditional forms of self-dealing.m Technically,
the business judgment rule is inapplicable until directors satisfy the duty of care
by exercising reasonable diligence. 9 Courts, however, often use the business
judgment rule as a jurisdictional barrier precluding any judicial review of the
duty of care standard. 60
Whereas the duty of care relates to reasonable business judgment,6 ' the duty
of loyalty proscribes conflicts of interest, or "disloyalty" to the corporation. 62

Tesoro Petrol. Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Northwest Indus. v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
53. Since greenmail does not actually involve a control motive, see supra note 4, managerial
submission to greenmail is technically distinguishable from self-entrenchment. However, since the
greenmailed directors' presumptions and fears are the same as those of directors facing an actual
takeover, greenmail is often referred to in terms of self-entrenchment motives as well.
54. See supra note 52 (self-entrenchment as breach of fiduciary duty).
55. Cohn, supra note 42.
56. MODEL BUtSNES COaRORATION AcT 5 35. The act has been adopted in whole or in part
by all 56 states. FLA. STAT. S 607.111 (1983) is identical to the Model Act provision. In the past,
some jurisdictions favored a more stringent standard, requiring directors to exercise such care as
an ordinarily prudent person would use in managing his or her own affairs. Professor Gordon
favors the modem trend, noting that the more restictive standard could lead management to become
risk-aversive and thus to avoid potentially profitable transactions. M. GORDON, supra note 41, at
S 21.0157. See supra notes 41-43. Delaware courts have defined "self-dealing" as any benefit accruing
to a director to the exclusion of and detriment to the interests of shareholders. The label is most
typically applied in situation& involving inequitable distribution of dividends. Sparks, Recent Devdopments in Substantive Business Judgment Rule, 61 N.C.L. Ray. 534, 537 (1983).
58. But see Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d. 556 (Del. Oh. 1977) ("the presumption of sound
business judgment reposed in a Board of Directors will not be disturbed if any rational business
purpose can be attributed to the decision").
59. Harrington, supra note 6, at 995. The business judgment rule "properly interpreted, may
not come into play until .and unless the duty of reasonable care has first been discharged." Id.
60. Id. at 995, 997. Cases have misapplied the rule without adequately considering whether
management has first satisfied the obligation of "exercising reasonable care in reaching the decision
to defend against a takeover effort - a necessary condition to the application of the business
judgment rule."
61. ' Cohn, supra note 42, at 603. The duty of care is defined in terms of competence and
normal capacity, while the business judgment rule amounts to a finding that directors have exercised
reasonable diligence in making their decisions. Id.
62. See Harrington, supra note 6, at 989 ("In contrast with the evolution of the duty of care,
courts recognized early that review of management conduct is especially appropriate where management has a conflict of interest in authorizing corporate transactions.").
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Although the business judgment rule's presumption of good faith should be
inapplicable to issues involving the duty of loyalty, 63 courts continue to invoke
this rule in situations involving conflicts of interest.64 Shareholders can only
overcome this barrier by showing that a tactic such as greenmail involved traditional forms of self-dealing, 65 or that the action taken had no rational business
purpose. 66 "Proving" that an action constitutes a proper business purpose"7
68
however, may easily be accomplished by pretextual explanations.
A self-entrenchment motive alone is therefore insufficient to overcome the
business judgment rule where the injured shareholder claims a breach of the
duty of care or the duty of loyalty. 69 In the recent case of Treco, Inc. v. Land
of Lincoln Savings & Loan,' ° shareholders objected to Lincoln's plan for a public
offering of stock. The shareholders attempted to remove Lincoln's directors and
liquidate the company. Lincoln's management subsequently voted to amend the
corporate bylaws to require a supermajority shareholder vote of 75 percent to
remove a director from office. When shareholders sued for breach of fiduciary
duty, the district court held that since self-entrenchment was not the "sole"
motive for the decision, management's actions were protected under the business
judgment rule. The court found that the directors had acted in good faith to
71
prevent a liquidation.
Arguably, the reasoning applied in Lincoln Savings would also be applicable
to bar a suit by WDP shareholders in the wake of the Steinberg-WDP greenmailing. Steinberg had threatened to dismantle WDP, giving Disney's directors
a rational business purpose to submit to greenmail.2 The ease of fabricating
a proper business purpose will probably shield directors from liability in other
greenmail situations, notwithstanding the apparent conflicts of interest involved
3
when management uses corporate funds to preserve its position.

63. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3, at 714. "The good faith element of the business
judgment rule was formulated to strip the rule's presumption of validity from an officer or director
who ... had a 'material personal interest' in the outcome of the transaction." Id. (quoting Arsht,
The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 115-116 (1979)).
64. "(Tlhe courts can avoid any serious inquiry into, or review of, the fairness of the defensive
actions or of the underlying board motivation ... " through the business judgment rule. Harrington,
supra note 6, at 993.
65. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (traditional forms of self-dealing).
66. See Harrington, supra note 6, at 992 (discussing the leading case of Cheff v. Mathes, 41
De. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964)). Cheff established the "proper busines purpose" test. See also
Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3, at 717 (the effect of reading the good faith requirement out of
the business judgment rule is to focus "almost exclusively on the presence of any rational business
purpose" for management's actions).
67. See Harrington, supra note 6, at 992 (proper business purpose).
68. See id. at 993 ("it does not require great creativity to conjure up 'policy' differences with
a potential bidder."). The cases illustrate "one dominant theme" the courts' willingness to
apply the business judgment rule whenever management can offer "some ostensibly reasonable
pretext" for its actions. Id. at 1001.
69. See supra note 43 (self-entrenchment motive not enough to overcome presumption of good
faith).
70. 572 F. Supp. 1455 (N.E. D. Ill. 1983).
71.
Id. at 1460.
72. Wall St. J., supra note 15.
73. See supra note 68 (ease of fabricating rational purpose).
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Cases involving shareholder derivative suits illustrate how management uses
the business judgment rule to bar conflict of interest claims. This example is
analogous to the greenmail situation, since both involve self-preservation by
management at the expense of shareholder interests. Since derivative claims by
definition are brought on behalf of the corporation,7 4 courts have upheld decisions by corporate litigation committees to terminate the litigation under the
business judgment rule. 75 In fact, in the 1979 case of Lewis v. Anderson, a WDP
76
litigation committee terminated such derivative claims by WDP shareholders.
In Lewis, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the business judgment rule
applicable to the corporate committee's decision to discontinue plaintiffs' derivative claims, even though one member of the committee was a directordefendant in the litigation. 77 Recently, however, courts have begun to recognize
the inherent conflicts of interest involved in decisions to terminate shareholder
litigation, and have refused to apply the business judgment rule's presumption
of good faith under these circumstances. 7 This trend toward independent judicial scrutiny of management's actions should be extended to include greenmail
and other situations involving similar conflicts of interest.
The business judgment rule, moreover, should not apply where tender offers
are concerned. 79 According to SEC Division of Corporate Finance Director John
Huber, courts should abandon the business judgment rule's presumption of
good faith in situations involving hostile tender offers. The business judgment
rule was originally intended to apply only to internal managerial decisionmaking.8 Tender offers, conversely, are outside initiatives directed toward share-

74. The derivative suit is a claim brought by shareholders to enforce a corporate right which
ostensibly should have been pursued by the directors of the corporation. It involves a wrong to
the corporation rather than to the individual shareholder-plaintiffs, and any recovery therefore inures
to the benefit of the corporation rather than the shareholders. M. GORDON, supra note 41, at S
25.01.
75. E.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979) ("substantive aspects
of a decision to terminate a shareholders derivative action against defendant corporate directors ...
are beyond judicial inquiry under the business judgment rule." Id. at 996.) But see Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). The court noted, "we are not satisfied that acceptance
of the 'business judgment' rationale at this stage of derivative litigation is a proper balancing point.
IT]here is sufficient risk in the realities of a situation like the one presented in this case to justify
caution beyond adherence to the theory of 'business judgment'." Id. at 787. In addition to reviewing
the Auerbach issue of committee independence, the court applied its "own independent business
judgment" to determine whether the decision should stand. Id. at 787-89.
.76. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
77. Id. at 780.
78. Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984). A special litigation
committee does not enjoy presumption of good faith and disinterestedness. The court noted, "the
delegation of corporate power to a special committee, the members of which are hand-picked by
defendant-directors, in fact, carries with it inherent structural biases." Id. at 376.
79. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3, at 712 ("It is questionable that the rule should even
apply to decisions to resist a tender offer."). According to SEC Division of Corporate Finance
Director John Huber, courts should abandon the business judgment rule's presumption of good
faith in situations involving hostile tender offers. Reinterpret Business Judgment Rule in Takeovers, Huber
Says, 16 SEC. REG. &, L. REp. (BNA) No. 15 at 639, 639-40 (April 13, 1984).
80. See supra note 79.
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holders rather than management.8" Since the business judgment rule has
consistently been applied to cases involving breaches of fiduciary duties, however, greenmail will probably continue to be evaluated under its rubric.
B.

State Regulation of Tender Offers

The scope of state authority over tender offer regulation has been unclear
since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v.MITE Corp.5 2 In
MITE, the Court declared the Illinois Business Takeover Act unconstitutional
under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The Illinois Act
required an offeror to notify the Illinois Secretary of State and target management of its intent to make a tender offer and the terms of the offer twenty
days before the offer became effective. During this period, however, target
management was free to communicate with its shareholders regarding the offer.
MITE, as offeror, did not comply with the Illinois Act and sought a declaratory
judgment that the Act was both preempted by federal securities law and unconstitutional under the commerce clause."1
While a majority of the Justices split over whether federal law and the
federal policy of neutrality between offeror and bidder preempted the Illinois
Act, 4 the Court determined that the Act placed undue burdens on interstate
commerce." The Illinois regulatory scheme could encompass entirely out-ofstate transactions between a foreign offeror and shareholders residing in other
states." The Court feared that other state laws would create a conflicting regulatory scheme, having the unfortunate result of stifling securities transactions
generated by tender offers.87 The Court found this potential burden unjustified

81. The directors' mandate to act prudently with regard to a fully disclosed offer to shareholders is much less obvious than their authority to manage the company. Greene & Junewicz,
supra note 3, at 712-13.

82.

457 U.S. 624 (1982).

83.
84.

Id. at 628.
Justice White's preemption analysis, rejected by Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Stevens

(justices Marshall, Brennan and Rehnquist argued that the case was moot and should be dismissed.
Id. at 655-67.) noted that the Williams Act was intended to protect investors "while maintaining
the balance between management and the bidder." Id. at 634. In furtherance of this policy, White
argued, Congress had refused to impose a precommencement disclosure requirement upon the
offeror, since such a requirement would delay the offer. The Illinois Act, by imposing advance
disclosure prior to commencement of the offer, was found to "frustrate the congressional purpose
by introducing extended delay into the tender offer process." Id. at 637. Further, by providing
the target with additional time to resist the offer, the Illinois Act was found to "furnish incumbent
management with a powerful tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the stockholders who will not have an offer before them during this period. Id. at 635. This pro-management
feature of the Illinois Act, according to J. White, upset the careful congressional balance sought
to be achieved by the Williams Act. ld.
85. MITE was a Delaware corporation, with principal executive offices in Connecticut. Id.
at 626.
86. Justice White noted that states have a legitimate interest in protecting their citizens, but
have no interest whatsoever in protecting non-resident shareholders. Id. at 644.
87. Id. at 642. See also Corporal; Battles, supra note 5, at 1433-34. While most state regulation
of tender offers purports to augment federal protection of local investors, commentators note that
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by any state interest in protecting local shareholders.es The' Court stated that
the interest in protecting Illinois investors was "outweighed by the increased
risk that the tender offer will fail due to defensive tactics employed by incumbent

management.'

'89

The Supreme Court's invalidation of the Illinois Act 9° can thus be read to
promote shareholder protection through deterrence of manipulative defensive
tactics. Under this policy, states should not be precluded from regulating the
target's behavior during the offer.9 ' Since state regulation would only affect
corporations already subject to the chartering state's laws, the interstate com92
merce problem involved with regulating a foreign transaction would not arise.
Moreover, a balanced legal framework tailored to intrastate concerns would,
under the MITE analysis, enhance the protection already offered to shareholders
by federal law and prevent management's actions from causing a tender offer
to fail. Greenmail, unlike many other obstructive tactics, does not involve a
third party93 and is an ideal candidate for such regulation; local activity alone
would be subject to the state law.9 4 Federal legislation, however, would more
the true purpose is to protect local concerns against takeovers by outside interests. One such
commentator has stated, "[I]t is obvious that the underlying motives of the states' legislation ...
is to effectively preclude tender offers for companies located in their respective states." Id. at 1433.
88. See supra note 87.
89. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645.
90. After MITE, several takeover statutes have been held unconstitutional. Cf. Mesa Petrol.
Co. v. Cities Service Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma statute held unconstitutional
under the commerce clause as an "unreasonable restraint on interstate tender offers." Id. at 1427,
1431. The Oklahoma Act gave the Administrator of the Oklahoma Department of Securities the
power to delay the offer by passing on the adequacy of disclosure). See also Appalachian Co. v.
Consolidated Oil & Gas Co., 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 2047 (D.C. Colo. Oct.
28, 1983) (Colorado Securities Commissioner dismissed as defendant when he decided not to enforce
the Colorado Investor Protection Act, believing it to be unconstitutional after MITE).
91. Some authors note that a commerce clause challenge under MITE could be avoided by
tailoring the legislation to reach only resident shareholders. Such regulation, however, would still
impact on nationwide tender offers. Regulation of foreign corporations would clearly offend the
commerce clause by delaying the tender offer process. These concerns are often read for the
proposition that "[sjtate takeover legislation after MITE is not likely to survive a commerce clause
challenge ... because of the substantial impact on commerce involved in the regulation of nationwide
tender offers." Corporate Battler, supra note 5 at 1474. Conversely, an incorporating state's regulation
of the target's conduct during the offer involves a local entity and would enhance, rather than
frustrate, the availability of tender offers to shareholders.
92. The "internal affairs doctrine" supports state jurisdiction over local corporations. The
theory holds that the incorporating state has the right to regulate a corporation's internal affairs
and rests on the fiction of an implied contract between the chartering state and corporate entity.
Since corporate takeovers involve internal affairs of the corporation (i.e., a change in control),
critics of MITE argue that the internal affairs doctrine should support state regulation of the bidder.
Although MITE precludes this result, the doctrine remains valid with respect to the regulation by
the chartering state of management's fiduciary duties. Casenote, The Unsung Death of State Takeover
Statutes: Edgar v. MITE Corp., 24 B.C.L. REv. 1017, 1024 (1983). A state therefore should be
constitutionally allowed to alter those statutory duties by preventing management from interfering
with an outside offer.
93. See supra note 6 (traditional defensive tactics).
94. MITE suggests that regulation of bidder activity is suspect. See supra note 92. Regulation
of target activity, however, would create a more favorable atmosphere for tender offers. If man-
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readily assure uniformity and would offer extensive substantive regulation without creating the interstate commerce problem.
III.

EXISTING FEDERAL LAW REMEDIES

Many federal laws appear facially applicable to the greenmail problems addressed thus far. Among these federal laws are sections 12 and 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and sections 13(d), 13(e) and 14(e) of the
Williams Act. Close analysis of these laws as applied by the courts reveals their
ineffectiveness to combat greenmail. Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act
requires the registration of certain securities before they can be traded on the
open market. 9s This provision is intended to provide shareholders and potential
investor with information regarding the corporation.9 6 Further, federal law subjects issuers to more extensive disclosure requirements through the antifraud
provisions of the Securities Act. These provisions apply to all securities whether
registered under section 12 or not.97 Before the 1960's, federal provisions regulated most takeover battles, since these were conducted primarily through proxy
contests or exchange offers regulated by the 1933 Securities Exchange Act."'
The relatively recent trend toward the use of tender offers in control contests
led to the 1968 adoption of the Williams Act amendments. 99
Congress enacted the Williams Act ("the Act") to close the regulatory gap
in existing securities law by bringing tender offers within the reach of federal
disclosure requirements.""' The Act regulates stock acquisitions according to

agement were precluded from responding to greenmail under state law, the greenmailer could not
hope for a buy-out. Greenmail would thus be deterred and true takeover offers allowed to proceed.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1982) (requiring issuers to register with the SEC prior to trading in
securities. Intrastate and private offerings are exempted from registration under § 12).
96. H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2973, 2978 (The Securities Exchange Act requires disclosure of "pertinent information
securities ... sold in interstate commerce ... so that investors might be in a position to exercise
an informed judgment concerning the securities offered for sale to them.").
97. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 2811, 2812.
The failure to provide adequate disclosure to investors in connection with a cash takeover
bid or other acquisitions which may cause a shift in control is in sharp contrast to the
regulatory requirements applicable where one company offers to exchange its shares for
those of another, or where a contest for control takes the form of a proxy fight.
Id.
98. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus , 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
99.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), 78m(e), 78n(d)-(o (1982). In 1960, there were eight cash tender
offers involving $200,000,000 in securities. In 1982, counting only the 50 largest transactions cash
tender offers involved $48,200,000,000 in securities acquisitions. Prior to the 1960's, tender offers
were used mainly for non-takeover purposes, such as corporate repurchases. At present, however,
tender offers have replaced the proxy contest as the most popular means of obtaining control over
a corporation. Corporate Battles, supra note 5, at 1426-27.
100. See H.R. REP. No. 1711 supra note 97, at 2-4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws, at 2811-14. Prior to the adoption of the Williams Act, the tender offeror was not
required to disclose its identity or its intentions with respect to the corporation. Corporate Battles,
supra note 5, at 1429.
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form; for tender offers, disclosure must be made when the offer is initiated.10'
For open market purchases, disclosure is required within ten days after the
012
The Act does
holder obtains five percent of the issuer's outstanding securities.'
03
but the SEC has recommended eight
not define the term "tender offer,"'
0 4
The Act seeks to preserve a balance
characterisitics to identify tender offers.
of power in takeover contests by providing both the target and the offeror an
equal opportunity to argue their positions before the shareholders. Legislative
history of the Act shows that Congress adopted this neutral position because
05
it recognized that takeover bids could either benefit or harm market efficiency.
Legislators believed full disclosure would protect investors in both situations by
0 6
providing for an informed choice.
The neutral policy of disclosure in its present form is ineffective to protect
shareholders faced with greenmail. Rather than presenting shareholders with
balanced information to effectuate a decision, greenmail precludes any decision
at all. However, greenmail may be deterred if substantive disclosure require0 7
ments would alert target corporations of the greenmailer's true intention.
A.

Regulating the Offeror

Section 13(d) of the Williams Act 0 " requires purchasers to disclose certain
information within ten days of the acquisition of more than five percent of an
09
issuer's registered securities. Section 14(d) of the Act' imposes similar disclosure requirements on a tender offeror who would acquire more than five percent
through the completion of the offer. The SEC has rulemaking authority to
implement these provisions, and requires purchasers to file a Schedule 13D
0
form with the Commission and with the issuer." The Schedule 13D must give

101.

102.
103.

15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).

15 U.S.C. § 78re(d) (1982).
The SEC has always contended that the Williams Act applies to "unconventional" tender

offers, and the term was intended to be read flexibly in order to achieve the purposes underlying

the Williams Act. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3, at 664-65.
104. These elements are: (1) active, widespread solicitation of public shareholders; (2) solicitation for a "substantial percentage" of the corporation's shares; (3) an offer to purchase at a
premium over market price; (4) fixed, rather than negotiable terms; (5) whether the offer is conditional upon tender of a minimum, and sometimes a maximum, number of shares; (6) open for
a limited time; (7) pressure on shareholders to tender shares; and (8) public announcement.
Id. at 664 n.80.
105. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 97, at 4, reprined in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEws at 2813 ("[t]akeover bids should not be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in
providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management ...these bids are [also] made for

many other reasons, and do not always reflect a desire to improve the management of the company").
106. Id.
107.

See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (management can avoid greenmail by refusing

to pay).
108. 15 U.S.C. 9 78m(d) (1982).
109. 15 U.S.C. 5 78n(d) (1982).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d, (1984). Section 78n(d)(1) authorizes the SEC to prescribe rules
and regulations "as necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
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all relevant information regarding the purchaser, including the intent or motive
for the stock acquisition."'
SEC enforcement resources can only deal with a limited number" 2 of cases,
but courts have split over whether the issuer has implied private right of action
to enforce these provisions." ' In Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Limited," 4 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal granted the issuer a private right of action under section
13(d). The court found the acquisitor had inadequately disclosed an intent to
obtain control over the target's management, and reasoned that the obligation
to file with target management inferred the obligation to file truthfully.'
The
United States Supreme Court, however, assumed a different approach in Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 116 by deciding that tardy disclosure did not constitute the
irreparable harm necessary to grant injunctive relief. 7' Rondeau can be distinguished on its facts, since tardy disclosure, if adequate, does not have the same
consequences as nondisclosure. The Court noted in dicta, however, that section
13(d) was not intended to provide "a weapon for management to discourage
takeover bids."" ' Decisions following the Rondeau approach have denied issuers
standing to bring a claim under section 13(d)." '
In the greenmail context, the Dan River approach is better suited than the
Rondeau approach. Allowing issuers standing to sue on behalf of shareholders
may be the only means of ensuring a timely check against the submission of
misleading schedules by acquisitors.' 2o Further, if the Rondeau holding stands
for the deterrence of obstructive defensive tactics, 2' allowing issuers to demand
full disclosure would obviate the need for uncertain management to submit to
greenmail. The substantive disclosure required in a Schedule 13D, however, is
limited.

111.
Id. The Schedule 13D must contain: the names of reporting parties, source of funds,
citizenship or place of organization, number of shares beneficially owned, percentage of securities
represented by number of shares owned, and purpose of acquisition.
112. According to Stanley Sporkin, formerly the Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement,
the Commission's limited resources do not enable it to investigate every transaction that comes
within its jurisdiction. Sporkin, SEC Enforcement and the Corporate Board Room, 61 N.C.L. REv. 455,
456 (1983). Theodore Levine notes that the judicial trend toward disfavoring private actions under
the securities laws has had a negative impact on enforcement. This effect is due to the SEC's
partial reliance on private actions to supplement Commission enforcement. Levine, Recent Developments in SEC Enforcenent, 61 N.C.L. REV. 463, 464 (1983).
113. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3, at 668.
114. 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980).
115. Id. at 1223.
116. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
117. Id. at 59.
118. Id. at 58.
119. E.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 490 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying the
issuer standing under § 13(d)). "To the extent that any prior filings by Care were misleading,
the appropriate remedy would be an action for damages, [under Rondeau] an action which, however,
as noted, may not be maintained by this plaintiff." Id. at 665.
120. See Dan River, 624 F.2d at 1225. ("[Tlhe sole basis of standing in favor of the corporation
... is to enforce the statutory mandate to file a Schedule 13D, which is complete, accurate, truthful,
and not misleading.").
121.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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The Schedule 13D filed by the Steinberg Group stated the purpose of the
purchases of WDP stock as follows:
for investment as part of the general investment portfolios of the
Purchasers.. subject to price and subject to applicable laws and regulations, the Purchasers may increase their holdings but also reserve the right
to dispose of all or a portion of such Securities on terms and at prices determined
by them.... 122
The Group referred to control or influence over WDP only in connection with
increasing the investment value of its holdings. 2 3 If this statement was inadequate, and if WDP as issuer had standing to enjoin further purchases under
Dan River, Steinberg would have been required to disclose an intent to greenmail
Disney. Once WDP management realized it was in no danger of a takeover,
management unlikely would have submitted to greenmail and bought out Steinberg's holdings.'

24

While the Dan River court found a violation of section 13(d) based on a
lack of specificity,' 25 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal, in Chromalloy American
Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,126 refused to require specific disclosure of tentative
plans.12 The Chromalloy, court recognized that the degree of specificity required
in a Schedule 13D was a difficult issue. The court found that the offeror's
statement that it might "at any time ... seek control of Chromalloy" was
sufficient to alert investors to the potential change in control.' 28 The objective
of the Williams Act, the court reasoned, could be frustrated by overstatement
29
of the definiteness of a purpose to obtain control as well as by understatement.
The differing results in Dan River and Chromalloy thus illustrate the difficulty
courts have in evaluating issues of subjective intent, and suggest that a minimum
30
of specific information need be disclosed in the Schedule 13D.'
Most cases under section 13(d) deal with insufficient disclosure of an intent
to obtain control.' 3' Ironically, WDP faced what turned out to be accurate
disclosure of an investment purpose.2 32 Disney or its shareholders could argue
122.
123.

Complaint, supra note 8, at 9-10 (emphasis added).
Id.

124. Supra notes 34-35, 53 and accompanying text.
125. Dan River, 624 F.2d at 1225 ("The defendants at no point have declared clearly the
purpose of their acquisition.... Implicit ... is the idea that there was some purpose beyond mere
investment for investment sake.").
126. 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979).
127.
128.

Id. at 248.
See id. at 243-48.

129. Id. at 248.
130. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3, at 668 (typically, the Schedule 13D is a "model of
obfuscation").
131. E.g., Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin' Indus., 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(target sued the offeror under 5 13(d) for misrepresenting the purpose of the acquisition as an
"investment" when acquisitor intended to influence corporate affairs).
132. Theodore Levine, Associate Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, noted the

problems involved in SEC enforcement of "purpose" disclosure. Disclosure of an "investment
purpose," according to Levine, was formerly an easy case since the SEC could usually find some
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in a section 13(d) action that any reference to control was misleading. However,
proving that Steinberg never intended to control Disney would be problematic
without direct evidence. In addition, the references to control in Steinberg's
Schedule 13D were related to the protection of the investment value of the
Group's holdings.' 33 Steinberg's past history of greenmail, standing alone, would
be inadequate under Chromalloy to show the statement had misled Disney's
directors and shareholders.
The Disney scenario thus illustrates management's dilemma when disclosure
in the Schedule 13D accurately states a passive investment purpose, but the
acquisitor nevertheless threatens a takeover challenge. A greenmailer probably
will not divulge an intent to extort a profit from insecure management. The
difficulties of proving subjective intent may therefore be insurmountable. Moreover, at least one district court has held that an intent to greenmail corporate
directors need not be disclosed at all in the Schedule 13D. "'
In Chock Full O'Nuts v. Finkelstein,'35 the issuer sued a group holding fifteen
percent of its shares. The Schedule 13D filed by defendants was noncommittal
regarding the purpose of the purchases. Plaintiff alleged nondisclosure of a
purpose to extort a profit from management, i.e., greenmail, but the Southern
District Court of New York found the Schedule sufficient to give notice that
the holder would sell its shares at a profit if it could do so.' 36 The court noted
that the hope of profiting from an investment was too obvious to necessitate
additional disclosure; "Economic Man" is commonly understood to make investment decisions which will bring the highest rate of return." 7 Since any
rational investor would intuitively understand this principle, the court reasoned
protection was unnecessary and left issues of director responsibility to state
law.138
Under the Chock Full O'Nuts rationale, the Schedule 13D does not provide
a viable disclosure tool enabling issuers and shareholders to distinguish true
takeover attempts from greenmail. The holding neglects to consider shareholder
interests in accordance with the underlying purpose of the Williams Act." 9 The
reasonable investor may realize that every potential acquisitor has a price. Shareholders, however, are not parties to greenmail and thus cannot protect themselves. Chock Full O'Nuts should not be followed for the conclusion that weak
management is lawful prey for shareholder's profits. Instead, the case is more

evidence of an intent to achieve control. Modern drafting is more sophisticated in concealing a
control purpose. Levine, supra note 112, at 473. The emergence of greenmail, however, now frustrates evaluation of what was formerly the "easy case," since greenmail is primarily intended to
bring a highly profitable return on the greemailer's "investment."
133. Supra note 124 and accompanying text.
134. Chock Full O'Nuts, 548 F.Supp. at 212.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
NEws at

Id.
Id. at 218.
See id.
See id. at 219.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 97, at 4-5, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD
2513-14 (Williams Act was designed to "[m]ake the relevant facts known so that share-

holders have a fair opportunity to make their decision").
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easily rationalized as reflecting the difficulty of proving subjective intent. Thus,
if shareholders could show evidence that the greenmailer's only purpose was to
extort a high selling price for its shares from management, the result should
be different.1 40 Such a showing of intent, however, would probably fail if unsupported by direct evidence. Thus, offeror regulation is inadequate to protect
shareholders injured by greenmail.
B.

Regulating the Target

Section 13(e) of the Williams Act 4 prohibits issuers from making fraudulent,
manipulative, or deceptive repurchases of registered securities.' 42 SEC Rule 13e1'43 implements this provision by requiring the issuer to file certain information
with the SEC before the issuer can purchase its own securities during a tender
offer. 14 4 Although the broad language of this provision appears to apply to
greenmail as a manipulative repurchase,' 4 - the rule has been narrowly inter46
preted by courts and offers little substantive aid.
The District Court of Delaware addressed section 13(e) in Crane Co. v.Harsco
Corp.'4 7 In Crane, plaintiff began a tender offer for approximately fifteen percent
of Harsco's shares. Harsco determined that fewer'than 50,000 shares had been
tendered, and that arbitrageurs (professional investors) held about 400,000 shares.
Fearing that the arbitrageurs would tender to Crane, Harsco decided to repurchase their stock and subsequently filed a 13e-1 statement with the SEC.
Harsco began mailing the statement to shareholders, but the court blocked the
48
plan by issuing a temporary restraining order.
The court afforded Crane standing to sue under section 13(e) as the only
party able to obtain timely relief on behalf of shareholders. ' 9 The court, however, rejected Crane's substantive claims. Crane argued the Harsco statement
was misleading regarding the arbitrageurs in three respects. First, Crane alleged
the statement misrepresented Harsco's "active course of communications and
dealings with the arbitrageurs' '11 by implying the arbitrageurs had initiated the

140. See Chock Full O'Nuts, 548 F. Supp. at 219 ("[i]f offered a sufficient price by the existing
management ...this Insurgent group, and any group, will sell"). The Chock Full O'Nuts court
seemed to assume the defendant did intend to complete the offer, but was tempted by a more
profitable opportunity. The court did not deal with a situation where the offer is a "sham" from

the beginning, as in greenmail.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1982).
142. Id. This provision gives the SEC authority to "define acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
143. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1984).
144. Id. The purchaser-issuer must disclose: the title and amount of securities purchased, the
names of the holders and the market in which the purchases are made, the purpose of the purchase
and intended disposition of the shares, and the source of funds.
145. Infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
146. Infra note 175.
147. 511 F. Supp. 294 (D. Del. 1981).

148.
149.
150.

Id. at 297.
Id. at 301.
Id.
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transaction. 5' - Second, Crane contended the statement did not adequately disclose that Harsco was trying to repurchase the stock to block the Crane offer.
Finally, Crane alleged the statement inadequately disclosed the premium to be
paid to the arbitrageurs.' 52 The court nevertheless found the statement adequate
in all three respects'5 3 and rejected Crane's claim that the repurchase constituted
54
an illegal counter-tender offer.'
Crane's second theory charged a section 13(e) violation since Harsco mailed
the statement too late to ensure its receipt by shareholders before the repurchase
was consummated.' 5 5 The court, however, noted that Rule 13e-1 is silent regarding a requirement of advance notice to shareholders.' 5 6 The court did not
have to decide whether such a requirement should be read into section 13(e)
'5
itself, since the temporary restraining order had prevented any injury. 1
If Crane stands for the proposition that management is never required to
give shareholders advance notice before repurchasing, section 13(e) will be of
little help to shareholders seeking to prevent greenmail. Moreover, although
Crane allowed offeror standing where the issuer attempted to repurchase shares
from a third party, in greenmail the issuer repurchases shares from the offeror.
The greenmailer thus has no motive to bring suit under section 13(e). The
unanswered question in Crane, nevertheless, offers a potential remedy. Section
13(e), as part of the Williams Act, has the broad purpose of ensuring adequate
and timely dissemination of information to protect investors.' 5 8 Congress recognized that management could use repurchase programs such as greenmail to
strengthen and preserve its position, and legislators intended that shareholders
receive "full information regarding the company's activities and intentions con" '5 9 Without advance notice, however, aftercerning repurchasing its own stock.
the-fact disclosure will be ineffective to accomplish these goals. When management repurchases the shares before shareholders are notified, courts should not
hesitate to find a section 13(e) violation.
As the preceding sections illustrate, existing disclosure requirements alone
do not address the subtle issues of intent and purpose involved in greenmail.
Courts consistently have refused to give substantive force to disclosure provisions, regardless of the effect nondisclosure has on shareholder interests. Moreover, the federal disclosure provisions discussed apply only to registered securities,
leaving private and intrastate offerings unregulated. '6 To prevent abuse in these
unregulated areas, Congress included broad antifraud provisions in the Securities
Exchange Act.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
NEws at

159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 301-02.
Id. Seealso infra notes 220-26 (counter-tender offers).
Crane, 511 F. Supp. at 302.
Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 97, at 5, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
2814-15.
Id. at 5, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2815.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (regarding 5 12).
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C.

The Antifraud Provisions: Regulating Everyone

Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act' 6 'prohibits the use of
manipulative devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
This section applies to unregistered as well as registered securities, and regulates
the conduct of all parties involved in the transaction. 62 The right of action,
however, is limited by several technical requirements, including restricting standing to those who purchased or sold securities "in connection with" the ma163
nipulative practice (the "Birnbaum Rule").
Applied to the Disney scenario, a strict application of the Birnbaum Rule
would yield inequitable results. Since many WDP shareholders suffered diminished value of their holdings and not a loss from the purchase or sale of their
shares "in connection with" the Disney-Steinberg transaction, they would be
excluded as plaintiffs. This result is inconsistent with the purpose of section
10(b). The provision broadly prohibits practices which "artificially affect market
activity,"'' 6 and greenmail is such a practice. Investors who hesitate to exchange
their holdings during a greenmail attempt should not be precluded from relief
when the injury can be measured in terms of diminished stock value.
A minority of courts do allow standing for shareholders whose investments
diminish in value.' 65 Moreover, some courts allow shareholders to bring derivative suits on behalf of' the corporation if the corporation purchased or sold
securities during the relevant period.' 66 The issue in these cases is usually whether

161.
162.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
Id.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of ...interstate
commerce ...
(b) T6 use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
...any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and

regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
163. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that stockholders
injured by the defendant's sale of a block of stock constituting voting control had no standing
under § 10(b) since they were not themselves purchasers or sellers of securities). Accord Smith v.
Chicago Corp., 566 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (holding that plaintiffs, holders of securities

investment accounts, did not have standing under § 10(b) to claim that defendants had harmed
their investments by not making certain purchases as requested).
164.
165.

See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
Hern v. Stafford, 461 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. Ky. 1978) (allowing S 10(b) standing under

theory of "reliance by inaction" where plaintiffs were induced to retain their shares because of
misleading statements by management). But see Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714 (M.D.N.C.
1980) (rejecting "reliance by inaction" theory where plaintiffs were induced to retain their shares
by corporate director's scheme to artificially maintain a high selling price for its shares); Ohashi
v. Verit Indus., 536 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1976) (fraudulent inducement does not give shareholders

retaining their stock a § 10(b) cause of action).
166. Accord, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (plaintiff-shareholder's
derivative claim that majority stockholder used its influence to force the corporation to acquire
500,000 shares at an inadequate price allowed under S 10(b)); Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F.
Supp. 434 (E.D.Mo. 1971) (allowing stockholders standing for derivative claim under 5 10(b) if

sale of 53 percent interest in restaurant was "sale of securities").
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a given transaction constituted a "sale" or "purchase" of shares. 16 Greenmail,
however, by definition involves a purchase of stock, and the corporate entity
bears the resulting financial losses. A court's decision to give shareholders standing to sue in this capacity would thus be consistent with the concept of the
derivative action 6 and with the underlying policy of section 10(b). 69
In addition to the standing obstacle, Disney plaintiffs would have to overcome the Supreme Court's narrow definition of "manipulation" in section 10(b)
as interpreted in Santa Fe Industries v. Green.' 7 0 In Santa Fe, plaintiffs asked to
have a short-form merger 7' set aside because the appraisal price offered to
minority shareholders did not reflect the actual value of the shares.' 2 Dissenting
shareholders were effectively "frozen out"' 73 of the merger transaction by being
forced to accept an unsatisfactorily low price for their holdings. The freeze-out
was alleged to be manipulative under section 10(b), but the Court rejected
plaintiff's argument, noting that the claim amounted to no more than a breach
of fiduciary duty. 7 4 The Court suggested that "manipulation" is "virtually a
term of art" in the securities context, and relates to deception or nondisclosure
that affects market activity.' 75 The Court reasoned that Congress would have
used different language if it had intended to regulate issues of corporate mismanagement. Absent clear Congressional mandate, the court refused to interfere
76
with state causes of action.
Although greenmail profoundly affects market activity by blocking profitable
tender offers it apparently falls outside the Santa Fe standard. The Disney transaction did not involve "deception" in the traditional sense, since WDP management did not communicate information to shareholders. Commentators note,
however, that federal courts could avoid Santa Fe by "stretching" to find deception, or by expanding the definition of the term to include nondisclosure of

167. Ross v. Longchamps, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
168. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
169. In a derivative suit, the shareholders can satisfy the Birnbaum Rule if the corporation
was damaged as a result of the purchase or sale of securities. Hazen, Breaches of Fduciary Duty and
the Federal Securities Laws, 61 N.C.L. Rav. 527, 527 (1983).
170. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Commentators note that Santa Fe ended the trend toward broad
interpretations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. Greene & Junewicz supra
note 3, at 708. Prior to Santa Fe, courts often held that federal antifraud provisions imposed a
fiduciary duty on directors. After Santa Fe, however, the legitimacy of defensive tactics is generally
not considered within the scope of federal law. Harrington, supra note 6, at 905-06.
171.
The statutory short-form merger involved in Santa Fe allowed a parent company owning
90% of the subsidiaries' stock to merge with the subsidiary. Minority shareholders of the subsidiary
are bought out at a stated appraisal price. Harrington, supra note 6, at 906 n.26.
172. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 467.
173. A "freeze out" occurs where a majority of the stockholders can vote on a corporate issue
of major importance, such as the short-form merger provided for under Delaware law, supra note
170, leaving the dissatisfied minority no choice but to live with the decision or sell their share at
a stated appraisal price which may or may not reflect fair market value. Lynch & Steinberg, supra
note 6 at 906.
174. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 476-77.
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"unfairness" in the transaction.177 This broader approach is consistent with the
purpose of federal securities regulation, which is to ensure that shareholders
have access to all information necessary for an informed investment decision. 78
Moreover, the Santa Fe facts are distinguishable from the greenmail situation,
in that they only involved claims of nondisclosure and fiduciary duty. Since
plaintiffs in that case did not raise the claim that section 10(b) prohibits obstructive tactics which artificially affect market activity, the Court's definition
of manipulation in Santa Fe should not apply to greenmail.' 79 The short-form
merger at issue in Santa Fe is also distinguishable from greenmail. Full disclosure
in the short-form merger context ensures that stockholders are at least aware
of their options, but disclosure alone will not allow shareholders to make an
informed choice if defensive tactics are allowed to completely block the offer. 8
Courts continue, however, to read section 10(b) narrowly, as the recent
holding of the United States District Court of Delaware in Warner Communications,
Inc. v. Murdoch,' 8 1 illustrates. In Warner, the target corporation attempted to
thwart investor Rupert Murdoch's acquisition program by placing supermajority
provisions into the corporate bylaws. Warner also entered into a stock exchange
agreement with Chris-Craft Industries to create a "veto block" capable of opposing a Murdoch takeover. 8 2 The court rejected Murdoch's section 10(b) claims,
noting that investors should be charged with the "universal" knowledge that
directors will act to retain control in the face of a takeover attempt.' 83 This
presumption would virtually preclude courts from considering any defensive
tactic violative of section 10(b). Reading Chock Full O'Nuts and Warner together,
then, shareholders can expect no judicial protection from either target or offeror
84
in the greenmail case.'
The antifraud provision of the Williams Act, section 14(e), 85 similar to
section 10(b), applies to all securities and all parties. 8 6 This facially broad
antifraud provision applies specifically to manipulation in connection with any
tender offer but it has been limited by judicial decisions. 87 Any party to the

177. Harrington, supra note 6, at 908-09.
178. Id. at 910 ("[Tlhe purview of the Act therefore should not be limited to the adequacy
of disclosure but instead should be extended to protect a shareholder's right to make a decision
rather than allowing management to make his investment decision for him.").
179.
180.
181.

Note, Target Defensive Tactics As Manipulative Under § 14(e), 84 COLUM. L. REv. 228 (1984).
Manipulation With Full Disclosure, supra note 5, at 169.
581 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Del. 1984).

182. Id. at 1485-86.
183. Id. at 1492.
184.

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

185. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
186. Id. "It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
... or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with

any tender offer...." Id.
187.

Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (acquisition of one corporation by

another, at a grossly exaggerated price and for selfish purposes in resisting a tender offer, is not
within the scope of section 14(e)). "Manipulation" is not read to include breaches of fiduciary
duty. Tender Offer Defensive Tactics, supra note 32, at 623. The definition corresponds with the
definition of manipulation established for § 10(b) claims. Manipulation under both provisions con-
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tender offer, however, should have a right of action under this section and thus
avoid the "Birnbaum Rule" standing problem under section 10(b)." '
The United States Supreme Court addressed the standing issue in Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries,' 9 and denied the offeror a right of action for damages
under section 14(e). In so doing, however, the Court recognized the Williams
Act as an investor protection statute"1 ' and left open the issue of shareholder
standing under the Act. The Seventh Circuit's Court of Appeals subsequent
holding in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., "9,nevertheless, apparently denies standing to shareholders injured by greenmail. In Panter, plaintiffs, who were Marshall
Field shareholders, charged Field with entering into an expansion program as
part of a nondisclosed policy to resist all tender offers, including a proposed
offer from Carter Hawley Hale ("CHH"). 92 The expansion, which involved
Field's acquisition of a store which would compete with the offeror's NiemanMarcus store, caused CHH to withdraw its proposed tender offer.' 9 ' The court
reasoned that since the offeror withdrew the proposal before shareholders could
respond, the shareholders had not relied on management's tactics and, therefore,
had no cause of action under section 14(e). 9 4 The Panter rationale ignores the
fact that management's manipulative acts themselves may have promoted the
withdrawal of the offer. The court thus allows management to profit from its
wrongs.'
Such a result is inconsistent with the broad language and underlying
purpose of section 14(e). '"'
The Panter court did recognize that its narrow holding created potential for
abuses such as greenmail. The court noted in dicta that bidders who proposed
tender offers without intending to complete them should be enjoined from ex-

tains two elements: (1) intent to deceive or mislead investors; and (2) an artificial effect on market
activity. Id. at 633-36.
188. See supra note 163 and accompanying text ("Birnbaum Rule").
189. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
190. Senator Williams, sponsor of the Williams Act, designed the Act to protect legitimate
interests of both target and offeror. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 97, at 4, reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONo. & AD. NEWs at 2813. "The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in
favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid." Id. The Court in
Piper read this to mean that the "sole purpose" of the Act was to protect investors faced with a
tender offer. Harrington, supra note 6, at 903-04.
191.
646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
192. Id. at 287.
193. Id. at 281.
194. Id. at 283. ("[Blecause the CHH tender offer was withdrawn before the plaintiffs had
the opportunity to decide whether or not to tender their shares, it was impossible for the plaintiffs
to rely on any alleged deception in making the decision to tender or not.").
195. When target shareholders are precluded from responding to an offer because of obstructive
tactics, the motives and purposes underlying management's actions should be scrutinized. Traditionally, this inquiry has been restricted to an evaluation of management's fiduciary duties under
state law. However, the legislative history and broad language of federal tender offer regulations
should be read to preclude target management from acting to materially interfere with the shareholder's decision in response to the offer. Harrington, supra note 6, at 915.
196. If the Act's sole purpose is to protect shareholders, see supra note 190, then management's
tactics should be measured solely by their effects on investors.
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erting pressure on management. 97 The court, however, offered no guidelines
for distinguishing withdrawn "sham" offers from true tender offers. Without
such directives, the Panter holding does little to curb fraud in the greenmail
context.
Some courts read the "in connection with" standard of section 14(e) more
broadly than the Panter court and would allow standing where the offer has
been announced but has not become effective. 98 Although under this minority
view Disney shareholders would apparently qualify for a private right of action
under section 14(e), the narrow definition of "manipulation"' 99 again would
pose an obstacle to relief.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal read "manipulation" broadly, however,
in Mobil v. Marathon Oil.20 0 In Mobil, plaintiff announced a tender offer in order
to acquire Marathon. Marathon then sought a more attractive merger partner,
' 20 1
USS
and began negotiating with U.S. Steel ("USS") as a "White Knight."
then made a competing tender offer for Marathon stock, and Marathon directors
voted to recommend the USS offer to the shareholders. USS also acquired an
irrevocable option to purchase approximately seventeen percent of Marathon's
shares ("lock up" option). 20 2 Additionally, if USS's offer failed and a third
party acquired Marathon, USS retained an option to buy Marathon's oil and
mineral rights in the highly valuable property known as Yates Field ("crown
jewel" option). 20 3 Thus, even if Mobil's bid succeeded, its resulting acquisition
would be much less valuable due to the loss of Yates Field, Marathon's "crown
jewel. "204 The court found the lock-up option manipulative because it artificially
affected and, in fact, completely blocked market activity in connection with the
5

2
offer. 0

The Mobil approach, emphasizing manipulation of market activity by "artifical means," is particularly relevant to greenmail. 206 Greenmail completely
blocks market activity in connection with the offer, and is "artificial" in that
it is "unrelated to the natural forces of supply and demand." ' 20 7 To remedy
this problem, one commentator has recommended that defensive tactics which
preclude shareholder consideration of an offer be judged under a stricter standard than the disclosure test established by Santa Fe. 20 8 Subsequent cases decided

197.
198.
however,
effective).
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Panter, 646 F.2d at 287.
See Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1980) (relief denied because offer withdrawn;
the court noted in dicta that standing would be allowed where the offer eventually became
Supra notes 174-76 (Santa Fe definition of manipulation).
669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
See supra note 6.
See supra note 6.
See supra note 6.
Id. at 367. See also supra note 6 ("crown jewel" defense).
Id. at 374.
Target Defensive Tats, supra note 179, at 255.
Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374.
Harrington, supra note 6, at 933.
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under section 14(e), however, illustrate that Mobil stands alone. 2"9 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeal has consistently held that manipulation involves nondisclosure or misstatement of material, objective facts.210 Management's motives
underlying a defensive maneuver are considered immaterial under this standard."1 ' Whether courts will continue to follow this approach in the greenmail
context remains uncertain. The courts' ease in relegating issues involving other
obstructive tactics to state law suggests that they would. 21 If, however, the
principal concern of the Williams Act is shareholder response to a tender offer, " '
then the Act should logically apply when management's submission to greenmail
precludes the opportunity to respond. Post-Mobil case law therefore does not
adequately consider the impact of obstructive tactics on market activity." 4
Moreover, the recent Second Circuit opinions lack support in the broad
language of section 14(e). The provision prohibits "manipulative" acts as well
as nondisclosure of material facts. When courts apply these standards interchangeably, finding one test satisfied when the other has been met, the "manipulative acts or practices" clause in section 14(e) is rendered meaningless.
The text of section 14(e) reveals that "manipulation" does refer to substantive
issues of fairness when managerial conduct artificially affects market activity.'"
The United States Supreme Court is currently reviewing the conflict between
Mobil and the Second Circuit's approach in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc."'
In Schreiber, the target's shareholders lost the opportunity to profit from Burlington's initial tender offer when Burlington withdrew it. Burlington subsequently submitted a less lucrative offer, allegedly with target management's
cooperation. The petition requests the Court to overturn the Third Circuit's
ruling in Schreiber that section 14(e) reaches only issues of disclosure. Petitioners
argue that Congress intended section 14(e) to reach the unique problems created
by tender offers, which may not be addressed by full disclosure. 217 Petitioner's
approach is particularly sound in the greenmail situation, since disclosure alone
does not prevent management from obstructing the offer before presenting it
to shareholders. Perhaps the Supreme court will utilize Schreiber to extend the
scope of section 14(e).

209. E.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983) (lockup option granted to third party in order to block a hostile takeover bid held not manipulative
without a showing of nondisclosure), Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.
1983) (corporation's sale of treasury shares to a corporate bidder in takeover contest resulting in
a less financially attractive target for competing bidder held not manipulative without a showing
of misrepresentation).
210. See supra note 209.
211. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (manipulation does not include breaches of
fiduciary duty).
212. See Data Probe Acquisitions Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1,4 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The
gravamen of the claim advanced here is a breach of management's fiduciary duty to shareholders,
a matter traditionally committed to state law....").
213. Note, supra note 32, at 641. ("The principal concern of the Williams Act is the ability
of shareholders to respond to a tender offer, not the ability of bidders to make one.").
214. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3, at 669.
215. Target Defensive Tactics, supya note 179, at 237-38.
216. 16 SEC. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 29, at 1223 (July 20, 1984).
217. Id.
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Regulating the Target as Offeror

The SEC recently raised a novel legal theory in SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale
Stores, Inc.,218 arguing that CHH's repurchase of its shares constituted an illegal
counter-tender offer. 219 In CHH, as in Crane, management repurchased from a
third party. 220 Despite third party involvement, the illegality argument should
apply with equal force to greenmail, where the corporation repurchases the
offeror's holdings. The court in CHH, however, read the SEC tender offer
elements 22' narrowly. The SEC had contended that CHH's repurchase plan
satisfied all eight tender offer requirements, but that CHH had not complied
with federal disclosure requirements for counter-tenders. 222 The court rejected
this theory, determining that the Commission had only proved two of the eight
elements necessary for a valid tender offer: public announcement and time
223
pressure.
The Crane court, as noted earlier, rejected a similar illegality claim. 224 Pressure on shareholders was, in the court's view, the essential characteristic of a
tender offer, and the privacy of the transaction negated the efficacy of publicity
and active solicitation. Payment of a premium alone, the court reasoned, does
225
not establish a tender offer.
Applying the Disney facts to the CHH and Crane holdings, the DisneySteinberg agreement would constitute a legal counter-tender because it was
privately negotiated and not widely solicited or publicized. This result is rational
in the greenmail situation. Steinberg, as a greenmailer, has no need for the
protection the Williams Act provides to ordinary shareholders-offerees. 226 The
injured parties are the shareholders not privy to the greenmail arrangement.
While federal law purports to protect shareholder interests, 227 courts defer to
state law when analyzing self-entrenchment claims, contending that defensive
tactics involve no more than internal corporate mismanagement. 2 8 As noted
229
however, the business judgment rule bars most state claims.
230
Greenmail, therefore, remains unresolved by either state or federal law.
The SEC and Congress have recommended measures to constrict the gaps in
legal coverage of tender offers, through which greenmail has thus far passed.
These proposals, however, represent an inadequate resolution of the problem.

218.

587 F. Supp. 1248 (C.D. Cal. 1984).

219. Id. at 1250 (CHH had repurchased over 50% of its outstanding common stock in order
to defeat
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

an attempt by The Limited, Inc., to obtain voting control over the company).
Supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1984).
Carter Hawley Hale, 587 F. Supp. at 1253-55.
Supra note 155.
Crane, 511 F. Supp. at 296.
See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (Act intended to protect investors faced

with a hostile acquisitor).
227. See supra notes 105-06 (legislative history of Williams Act).
228. See e.g., Santa Fe, supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 55-69 & 176 and accompanying text (business judgment rule as a barrier

to recovery under state law).
230.

See Target Defensive Tactics, supra note 179, at 255.
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PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

The SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers issued its final report on
July 8, 1983."31 The Committee based the report on the premise that federal
securities laws should remain neutral, favoring neither offeror nor target.,,' The
Committee believed that tender offers were the best way to ensure that terms,
price, and conditions were equally available to all shareholders. One of the
Panel's recommendations would ban greenmail by prohibiting an issuer from
repurchasing its securities at a premium if the shareholder had held the stock
for fewer than two years. If management obtained prior shareholder approval,
233

the transaction would be allowed.

The Panel cautioned that regulation of one type of takeover transaction
should address the effect on securities regulation as a whole. 2 14 If a greenmail
scheme did not fall within the proposed ban, however, the Committee's support
of the business judgment rule would probably preclude any relief under state
law. 2 5 Expanding this loophole, the Committee urged federal courts to leave
the shareholder-manager relationship to state law. 23 6 This reliance on the business judgment rule, according to Felix G. Rohatyn, testifying before the House
2
Panel on Tender Offer Reform, only encourages greenmail. 31
Congress responded to the Committee by proposing legislation intended to

231. SEC Advisory Panel Issues Report on Changes in Tender Offer Laws, 15 SMe. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 28, at 1339 (July 15, 1984) [hereinafter cited as SEC Panel Report].
232. "Tender Offer Panel's Recommendations Are 'Radical' Proposals," Treadway Says," 16 SEc. REG.

& L. REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 468 (March 9, 1984). SEC Commissioner James Treadway criticizes
this premise of neutrality, calling such a system a "raw" free market which does not account for
measures to protect shareholders such as a minimum period in which to consider a tender offer.
Id.

233. SEC Panel Report, supra note 231, at 1339. The requirement of shareholder approval is
desirable, since shareholders, as targets of the offer, "should logically determine the nature of
management's response." Further, such a requirement allows management to know the "precise
extent of its discretion" when faced with a takeover bid, reducing uncertainty and the possibility
of litigation. However, the requirement is problematic in that it would be difficult to obtain shareholder approval during the typically brief duration of the offer. Advance authorization may be the
only realistic alternative, but such authorization would necessarily be general, thus giving management a blank check to engage in defensive tactics legitimized by shareholder approval. Greene
& Junewicz, supra note 3, at 725-26.
234.

SEC Panel Report, supra note 231, at 1339.

235. Id. See also supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text (business judgment rule bars most
state claims). The Panel urged emphasis on shareholder democracy in the form of advisory votes,
but noted that directors shouldn't be "bound to act against their business judgment in the shareholder interest." SEC Panel Report, supra note 231, at 1340.
236. SEE Panel Report, supra note 231, at 1333. The SEC itself has faulted the Committee's
reliance on the business judgment rule. The Commission would prefer that courts give equal weight
to shareholder interests when resolving a takeover dispute. SEC Faults Advisory Panel's Reliance on
Business Judgment Rule in Takeovers, 16 SEC REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 495, 496 (March

16, 1984).
237.

House Panel Finds Little Agreement on Federal Tender Offer Law Reform, 16 SEC REG. & L.

REP. (BNA) No. 21, at 915 (May 25, 1984). If the SEC recommendations become law, they would
tip the balance heavily against target companies and their shareholders in favor of raiders and
greenmailers. Id. at 916.
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regulate tender offers in general and greenmail in particular. Many senators
have spoken out on the issue. Senator Heinz stated that greenmail "undermines
the savings and retirement of thousands of Americans", and that "small investors are the ones hurt by the duplicity of this selfish, self-serving sellout.''238
Senator Riegle noted that greenmail had become such a widespread practice
that in March of 1984 alone, four major companies had submitted to greenmail
at a cost of over $1.6 billion in corporate funds. 23 9 Senators Heinz

°

and Riegle, 24'

242

and Representative Wirth have proposed bills to ban greenmail. Each version
would prohibit an issuer from repurchasing its shares at a price above the
market from any person holding more than three percent of a class of securities
for fewer than two years. 243 The repurchases, however, would be allowed if
management obtained prior shareholder approval or made the identical offer to
all shareholders. 24 The Heinz and Wirth proposals are unique because they
both provide for shifting the burden of proof under the business judgment rule,
requiring management to prove that its actions are both prudent and fair to
the corporation and shareholders. 245 All proposals would amend section 14 of
the Securities Exchange Act, but most are silent regarding private rights of
action. 246 The Wirth bill provides shareholders a private cause of action for
injunctive relief, however, and forces management to shoulder the burden of
proof.

247

In a June 7 memorandum to the House Energy and Commerce Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance Subcommittee, Wirth noted
that most congressmen agreed on "limited - but important - reform legislation that could be moved through the House with bipartisan support. "248 Wirth

238. Heinz Bill Would Create Federal Claims Against Managements That Pay Greenmail, 16
& L. REp. (BNA) No. 25, at 1066 (June 22, 1984).

SEC.

REG.

239. Id. at 1067.
240. S. 2777, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Since this note was written, S. 2777 died in the
Senate Banking Committee.
241. S. 2754, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 130 Cong. Rec. S. 7166 (daily ed. June 14,
1984), reintroduced as S 286, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
242. H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Since this note was written, H.R. 5693 died
on the floor of the House.

243. E.g., S 2777, supra note 240. The wording of the bill read.
It shall be unlawful for an issuer to purchase, directly or indirectly, any of its securities at a
price above the market from any person who holds more than 3 per centum of the class
of the securities to be purchased and has held such securities for less than two years,
unless such purchase has been approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the
aggregate voting securities of the issuer, or the issuer makes an offer to acquire, of at
Id.

least equal value, to all holders of securities of such class and to all holders of any class
into which such securities may be converted.

244.
245.
246.
247.
the floor
248.

Id.
E.g., S. 2777, supra note 240.
E.g., id.
H.R. 5695, 98th Cong 2d Sess. (1984). Since this note was written, H.R. 5695 died on
of the House.
Wrirth Subcommittee Reports Bill to Reform Tender Offer Procedures, 16 SEaC.
REG. & L. REp,

(BNA) No. 27, at 1138 (July 6, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Wirth Reports Bill].
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had supported a comprehensive takeover reform bill, but was urged by subcommittee members to postpone more complex issues until the following year. 4
Wirth's "limited bill" would address major abuses and regulatory gaps such
as greenmail."" Wirth's bill was reported out of the House Energy and Commerce Committee on August 2, 1984, but the other bills have seen no action. '
Subcommittee amendments to the Wirth proposal prohibited repurchases from
any person holding more than three percent of a class of securities, whether
holding for fewer than two years or not. 2 The Committee reinserted the twoyear provision. 2 ' An additional subcommittee amendment empowers the SEC
to exempt companies from the greenmail prohibition."' 4
Other proposals, which called for more fundamental changes in existing
securities law were offered during the 1984 Congressional session. The Wirth
and D'Amato bills would close the ten day window under section 13(d)-"' and
provide investors with earlier notice of a potential change in control. Other
provisions in the Wirth and D'Amato proposals would prohibit issuers from
repurchasing stock during a tender offer if the offering price is more than
twenty-five percent over the market price. 2 ' These provisions allow exceptions
for "routine acquisitions." 2'
Representative Penny has introduced a bill which,
would amend section 14(e) by specifically defining certain defensive maneuvers
as "manipulative". 2 8 Additionally, Representative Wirth has recently introduced a bill which would require bidders to hold tender offers open for sixty
days if made in anticipation of, or in competition with, other tender offers.-"
The blanket bans on greenmail are defective in several respects.""' Other
provisions offer potential solutions to the greenmail problem, but are directed

249.

House Committee Approves Bill to Limit Tender Offer Abuses, Defensive Tactics, 16 SEc

R~c

& L. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at 1279 (August 3, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Committee Approves Bill]
250.
Wirth Reports Bill, supra note 248, at 1138.
251.
Committee Approves Bill, supra note 249, at 1279. See supra notes 240, 241, 242, 247, 258
& 259 (current status of legislative proposals).

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Eg., H.R. 5693, supra note 242.
Id.

257. Id. While it is unclear what is meant by "routine acquisition", this exception would
presumably allow some flexibility in the restrictions where stock repurchases are initiated for legitimate economic reasons. See infra note 265.
258. H.R. 5914, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The manipulative practices prohibited include:
sale or purchase by principal stockholders of any shares at consideration greater than that given
to other stockholders pursuant to a nondisclosed agreement, an issuer's refusal to permit an offeror
who is a shareholder of record to inspect the target's list of shareholders, and the solicitation of
acceptance or rejection of an offer before the filing of a description of the securities offered. Id.
Since this note was written, H.R. 5914 died on the floor of the House.
259. H.R. 5972, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Since this note was written, H.R. 5972 died
in the House Committee on Energy, Commerce and Telecommunications.
260. SEC staff officials noted, however, that Carter Hawley Hale would have been unable to
use self-tender to defeat The Limited's offer if the proposed legislation were effective. Legislative
Proposal Limiting Tactics to Defend Takeovers Approved by SEC, 16 SEc. REC. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
19, at 793, 794 (May 11, 1984).
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toward tender offer issues other than greenmail. While Wirth's aides believed
that a "popular" bill addressing well-publicized abuses such as greenmail could
pass easily, 261 Congress should not take an easy regulatory route that inadequately addresses problem areas.
An absolute ban on greenmail is facially appealing, but an isolated provision
probably would not provide effective relief.262 Existing proposals are both overinclusive and under-inclusive. 263 The prohibition against repurchasing shares
from an investor holding more than three percent, for instance, does not square
with the five percent ownership necessary to trigger federal disclosure under
sections 13(d) and 14(d). 264 When Congress adopted the Williams Act its members knew that stock repurchases by issuers could serve a number of legitimate
purposes. 265 If repurchases from small holders required shareholder approval or
an offer to all shareholders, ordinary transactions could be delayed and complicated. Management would thus be rendered less efficient overall. Moreover,
the price standard under the proposals, "a price above the market, ' 266 is too
vague.2 67 An error in calculation or in timing could expose innocent management
to costly and time-consuming litigation by dissatisfied shareholders. Although
these standards prove to be too harsh in their impact on management, other
methods leave substantial loopholes in greenmail regulation.
The opposite extreme in setting a price standard is exemplified by the prohibitions against issuer repurchases during tender offers at a price per share of
more than twenty-five percent over market. 26 The greenmailer could comply
with these provisions simply by offering at a price per share which is only
twenty-four percent over the market price. 269 Similarly, limiting the greenmail
ban to purchases from persons holding for less than two years allows for easy
evasion of the law's purpose. 2 0 The patient greenmailer will simply retain the

261. Wirth Introduces Bills to Limit Tender Offer Abuses, 16 SEc. REG. & L.
21, at 913 (May 25, 1984).

REP.,

(BNA) No.

262. Robert Greenhill cautioned against changes that do not address the total system. SEC
Panel Reports, supra note 231, at 1339.
263. See also supra note 90.
264. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
265. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 97, at 5, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws,
at 2814 (For example, the need to reduce outstanding capital stock following a cash sale of subsidiaries; the need to have shares available for options, acquisitions, employee stock purchase plans,
etc.).

266. See supra note 243.
267. In CHH, discussed supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text, Judge Tashima criticized
the SEC's attempt to define "premium" based on a "theoretical unaffected market price." The
SEC had taken the position that "premium" was any price in excess of the market, but Judge

Tashima noted that "the Commission's position in this action

...is

both unworkable and un-

tenable." The vagueness of such a standard would mean that "absolutely no certainty or guidance

would be available to the investment community." Id. at 1254.
268. H.R. 5693, supra note 242.
269. See supra note 3, at 671 (if a specific percentage is established, bidders will simply buy
just less than the threshold amount).
270. See id. at 732 ("It is hard to understand why a two-year holding period ...should purify
the transaction such that it becomes proper to dispense with shareholder approval."). Some commentators note, however, that shareholder input can only be beneficial. Their response to the
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shares until this period expires, freeing management to respond with a premium
offer once the greenmailer threatens a takeover. Finally, the requirement that
shareholders approve the transaction may be a meaningless check on management's authority. Management, with its superior access to proxy machinery, " '
rarely fails in obtaining shareholder approval for its actions.
Thus, while these proposals place some limitations on greenmail, they do
not go far enough. An explicit private right of action should be included in
all proposals, to aid SEC enforcement of the greenmail provisions. 22 Rather
than attempting to regulate greenmail with a single proposal, Congress should
adopt legislation which addresses the problem in a more far-reaching and inclusive manner.
V.

AUTHOR'S

RECOMMENDATIONS

The over-inclusive aspects of greenmail legislation may be relaxed without
providing an easy method of evading the prohibitions. Congress can close resulting loopholes by amending other securities provisions, such as section 14(e).
For example, the percentage of shares required to trigger greenmail legislation
should be increased from three percent to five percent, making it consistent
with existing disclosure requirements. This increased percentage would make
routine transactions between the issuer and small shareholders less complicated.
In addition, only repurchases at a price "substantially over market" should
come within the reach of the prohibition. Such a standard avoids easy compliance under a fixed percentage,2
while allowing management some degree
of leeway for error or miscalculation. 274 While this may lead to the type of
27
judicial discretion exhibited in the context of the business judgment rule, 1
other changes in federal law should limit that discretion.
The provision in Senator Heinz' and Representative Wirth's proposals for
shifting the burden of proof is valuable. Such a procedural standard will facilitate
hearing shareholders' claims on their merits. Imposing a rebuttable presumption
on target management is reasonable, in that the target has superior access to
information regarding its motives. Further, the test does not interfere with the
corporation's internal management, but only requires the target to explain its
conduct.2 7" Moreover, any tactic which has the effect of precluding shareholder

argument that a shareholder vote amounts to no more than a rubber stamp is that (1) this is not
necessarily the case where a profitable tender offer is concerned; (2) advocacy of shareholder democracy should not be stifled because shareholders may not vote "against their own best interests"
and (3) paternalism is outmoded; shareholders are entirely justified in voting their pocketbooks.
Harrington, supra note 6, at 1025-26.
271. See Manipulaton With Full Disclosure, supra note 5, at 161 (control battles through proxies
give incumbent managers an edge over the offeror, since management has access to corporate funds
while the offeror must use his or her own resources.) See also Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3,
at 724-25 (management may wield significant influence over the outcome of a shareholder vote,
since it controls the proxy solicitation process).
272. Supra note 172 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (business judgment rule).
276. Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 933.
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response to a hostile tender offer is motivated by the purpose of defeating the
offer.2 "7 According to one observer, "any other position ignores the realities of
the corporate world.

"278

The term "manipulation" in existing federal law should be redefined to
include "any action taken for the primary purpose of withdrawing a tender
offer from shareholder consideration. ' 27 9 This rewording would raise evidentiary
problems of proving a primary purpose, but would force courts to read manipulation more broadly in the greenmail context. Courts could then continue
to evaluate legitimate defensive tactics under state law and federal disclosure
28 0
provisions.
Congress could remedy defects in shareholder approval requirements by passing an amendment mandating more substantive requirements under existing
disclosure rules for proxy solicitation. Congress could also require freezing the
offer until management has had an opportunity to contact its shareholders.2
Requiring supermajority approval rather than a simple majority would render
shareholder input more meaningful by reducing the chances for management
22
to obtain carte blanche simply because of its incumbent authority,
One of the most problematic aspects of greenmail is the dilemma directors
confront. Disclosure alone will never alert management to the greenmailer's
true intention.23 To require management to rely on past history when faced
with what appears to be a real threat to the corporate structure is unreasonable.
If Representative Wirth's proposal for freezing tender offers were made applicable to all bids, 284 however, the greenmailer could be deterred from initiating

the sham offer. Restricting management's actions during the freeze would preclude any hope of a bidder pay-off, and force offerors to consider their intentions
more seriously. State regulation of target activity during the tender offer 2s
should also be considered, since federal provisions may prove insufficient to
restrict management's options in responding to the offer.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Greenmail reduces the value of shareholder's investments and leaves shareholders with no voice in decisions which radically affect their interests. Greenmail also diminishes corporate funds and damages the corporate image35

6

Once

277. d.
278. Id.
279.

&e H.R. 5914, supra note 258 (Penny's bill defining "manipulative" defensive acts).

280. Lynch & Steinberg, st.pra note 6, at 939. The test used to evaluate defensive tactics not
"solely communicative in nature" should vary according to the effect on the shareholder's ability
to respond. Conversely, tactics that do not impede a shareholders decision should continue tor be
judged according to adequacy of disclosure. Id.
281. See supra notes 105-06, and accompanying text. (Substantive disclosure to shareholders
allows for informed, independent decisionmaking.). See also supra note 233.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Supra note 271 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91-9+ and accompanying text.
Financial defensive tactics have two negative effects: (1) shareholders are deprived or the
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management has shown a willingness to submit to greenmail, other investors
may attempt to extort premiums in buy-out transactions. Furthermore, greenmail burdens society as a whole through inefficient business practices. Present
regulation of defensive tactics is inadequate to protect investor interests.
Federal legislation is needed to balance the interests of bidders and targets
in true takeover contests, as these bids serve an important function in a market
economy. Protecting management against all offerors in an attempt to deter
greenmail would solidify inefficient management and contrapose shareholder interests. Federal regulation, however, should provide substantive protection to
management as well as investors when the underlying issue involves money
rather than control.
Legislation should be tailored specifically to prevent courts from taking a
hands-off approach to gross corporate mismangement under the business judgment rule. The law should, however, be broad enough to allow for routine,
efficient business practices. Distinguishing tactics which obstruct takeover bids
from those which merely affect the power relationships between the parties
should accomplish these dual goals. Meanwhile, courts should re-evaluate the
business judgment rule in takeover situations involving greenmail as well as in
other defensive contexts where internal management of the corporation is not
at issue.287 States should also consider enacting post-MITE legislation to regulate
intrastate corporate behavior.88
The greenmail dilemma involves subtle issues which cannot be controlled
in an absolutist fashion. As the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers
noted, regulation should not stifle innovation in the securities market.289 Greenmail is an abuse of the tender offer process, which ordinarily has a legitimate
place in the securities market. Greenmail legislation, therefore, must remain
flexible to curb abuse withoul stifling the otherwise healthful process.
TERESA

chance to tender their holdings at a profit; and (2)
resulting in a lower market value for the target's
Greene & Junewicz, supra note 3, at 702-03.
287. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying
288. Supra note 94 and accompanying text.
289. Exerpts from Final Report of SEC Advisory
REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1375 (July 15, 1983).
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defenses weaken the target's financial condition,
shares in the aftermath of the takeover contest.
text.

Committee on Tender Offers, 15
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& L.
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